This author (1) offers an analysis of the familiar type of excuse that Aristotle categorized as "acts owing to ignorance." (2) exhibits the conditions under which ignorance of fact either fails or succeeds in absolving an agent of responsibility, and (3) shows how these considerations can be used to illuminate the nature of the mental element in responsibility.

This paper is an analysis of the concept "Mistake in Performance," a phrase first coined by Miss Elizabeth Anscombe in her monograph On Intention. The author shows that examples of a mistake in performance are nothing but cases of ordinary mistakes of judgment. The only difference between the two is that in cases of mistake in performance the agent acts on the basis of an erroneous judgment, that is, he fails to do what he intended to do.

A critical discussion of the "recipe" theory of causation, as proposed by Douglas Gasking. The author also proposes his own theory of the ordinary meaning of statements of the form "A causes B.".

The purpose of the paper is to discover a rationale for the practice of attaching excuses to criminal responsibility. I do this by criticizing the theory of h l a hart that we adopt this practice largely because it gives persons more power to predict and determine their liability to punishment than would a system of "strict" liability. I extract from my criticisms of hart the alternative theory that we adopt the institution of excuses because it insures that persons do (...) not assume burdens beyond what it is necessary to assume for the benefits of the legal system to accrue to all. (shrink)

This is a review of Laurence Houlgate's "Family and State: the Philosophy of Family Law. It takes a look at the moral theory from which Houlgate begins and raises questions about is correctness and appropriateness, but it finds more to agree with with respect to his middle-level principles. It considers his definition of "family" in the context of contemporary political controversy over such definitions. It looks at his consequentialist justification for the family, agrees with it, and suggests additional supplementary arguments, (...) primarily from Brigitte and Peter Berger, to give additional support for Houlgate's argument. It looks at his justification for family law and agrees with his principle of optimum communal benefit. It seeks to place Houlgate's views within the context of contemporary political debate about being "pro-family" or "anti-family". It then goes on to look briefly at some of the specific issues of family law that Houlgate considers, taking time to raise a few questions about some of them, and concludes by dealing in a more extensive way with the question of what the extent and limits of state interference in the family should be, agreeing with Houlgate's basic position, but considering further its application to specific issues. (shrink)

The author contends that none of the rationales for not allowing ignorance of the law as an excuse in criminal law cases is persuasive. The paper begins by analyzing the condition under which "reasonable" ignorance of the law ought to be allowed as an excuse. Second, the author indicates in greater detail the sense in which 'justice' requires that we recognize these conditions. Third, the author critically examines the arguments used by legal theorists for disregarding the claims of justice to (...) the individual defendant in cases where reasonable ignorance of law is alleged. Finally, the author wants to show that philosophy matters. A philosophical reading of ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the law does not excuse) can expose conceptual errors that are not seen in legal readings. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Norman Malcolm's claim that things that do not have the human form (e.g. trees, tables, computers) cannot' understand' or 'think' because they cannot point at, reach for, go to, look at, fetch or get something.

This book is a unique introduction to the philosophy of law that repairs an enormous gap in the philosophy of law -- a lack of philosophical attention to family law. (In fact, PhilPapers does not recognize the philosophy of family law as a category.) This book uses only cases drawn from family law to illustrate the traditional problems of legal philosophy. This is why I wrote this book as a textbook rather than as a monograph. My hope is that students (...) will learn more about the problems of legal philosophy by using cases with which they might be more familiar than from criminal law cases. Questions for thought and discussion follow each chapter. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to provide a better foundation for the legal rights of children than what now exists. The first part of the book describes the current legal status of children and critically discusses the traditional arguments for denying certain legal rights to children while granting them others. The second part describes and defends a general theory of children's rights, based on the principles of utility and egalitarian justice. The third part shows how the theory justifies significant (...) change in the current legal system. (shrink)

This book begins with an overview of the current legal status of children under U.S. federal and state law, It includes an analysis of relevant Supreme Court decisions and an extended critique of the philosophical arguments for treating children differently from adults under the law. Sections in the book include discussions of the need for a theory of juvenile rights, the moral arguments that prop up such theories, Professor Houlgate's proposal for a theory, and a final discussion of the applications (...) of his theory to the debates about status offenses, child neglect, and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. (shrink)

I. Although there has been considerable recent dispute as to what Socrates meant by saying that Virtue is Knowledge, if the claim is, as it is sometimes taken to be, that knowledge of the essential nature of virtue is sufficient for virtuous behavior, then it is only necessary to point out what seem to be quite obvious counter in stances. The fact of moral weakness, coupled with what large numbers of scientists and lawyers and plain men now believe about the (...) capacity of human beings for self-control, demonstrates that a man can surely know the good and yet fail to do the virtuous thing. What, then, is left of the view that Virtue is Knowledge? (shrink)

The object of this article is to clarify the relationship between morality and family law in a variety of legal situations. This will give the reader a better grasp of the kind of case to be included in the traditionalist claim that the idea of legal intervention in the family is a coherent notion. Once this is sorted, we will be in a position to discuss and clarify the radical thesis that "the personal is political.".

This article is primarily a defense of the Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). It is secondarily a comment on a recent controversy over the validity of its use in philosophy. I argue that the controversy rests on a misinterpretation. By extending the analysis of the objections (and here I invoke Descartes' famous method of possible doubt) I show that the occurrence of a paradigm and the fact that a concept is normally used to describe that paradigm logically entails not that the (...) paradigm is instantiated, but only that it is correct to apply that concept to that paradigm. In this manner the ontological fallacy is avoided, and further, this enforces the important separation between saying something about the correct application of a concept and saying something about its meaning. (shrink)